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Abstract
Uno Kōzō (1897-1977)  was Japan's foremost  Marxian  economist.  His
critique  of  Marx's  method  in  Capital,  especially  regarding  the
“premature“ introduction of value-form analysis in vol. 1, has motivated
him to  rewrite all three volumes of Capital in his book The Principles of
Political Economy (1950-52). 
Notwithstanding  Uno's  increasing  popularity  in  international  Marx
research,  I  will  present  a  critical  paper  that  looks  at  a  fundamental
misunderstanding in Uno's reading of the value form. In what is one of
the most significant discussions of the value form in post-war Japan,
Uno argues that 'value' and money as its 'bearer' cannot be understood
in abstraction from personal interaction and human wants in commodity
exchange. By drawing on the Japanese documents and supporting the
view of Uno's rival Kuruma Samezō (1893-1982), I want to show that it
1
can, and how Marx understood the 'law of value' as a non-personal law
of social domination.1 
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What's work got to do with it?
In the popular discourses of the newly emerging 'critique of Capitalism' today
–  whether  the  Occupy  movement  in  the  US  and  parts  of  Europe,  the
indignados movement  in  Spain  or  the  general  anti-austerity  and  student
movements in Greece, Italy and the UK – there seems to be little dissent:
“Money  rules  the  world”.  The  empirical  evidence  is  clear:  incessantly,
immaterial  human  needs  (health,  education,  social  relations)  are
matter-of-factly commodified, meant to be turned into hard money.2 But what
has the labour theory of value that Marx uses to indroduce his  Capital as a
Critique  of  Political  Economy  –  probably  the  most  sustained  critique  of
bourgeois economics as a science and capitalist economy as a social relation
known to Man –  got to do with the fact that we simply live in a commodity
producing and consuming society? And what is the social nexus that brings
money about, making it 'rule the world' in the first place? Why, in fact, is 'value
1 I want to thank Raji C. Steineck, Moishe Postone and Harry Harootunian for their helpful comments and 
criticism on earlier drafts of this article, and especially Ōtani Teinosuke for providing me with useful  
literature and correcting some of the Japanese transliterations.
2 An impressive study of the commodification of education in the U.K. is presented by M. de Angelis and D.
Harvie in de Angelis, Massimo and D. Harvie 2009, pp. 3-30.
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form analysis' a much more radical approach than simply saying that 'money
rules the world'? And what's work got to do with it?
In a letter to his friend Ludwig Kugelmann about a reviewer of Capital vol. 1
(which had been published the previous year), Marx wrote in July 1868:
Considering  'Centralblatt',  that  man  makes  the  biggest  possible
concession when he admits that if you think of value as anything at all,
my conclusions are correct. The poor chap won't see that if there were
indeed  no  chapter  on  'value'  in  my  book,  the  analysis  of  the  really
existing relations that I provide would contain the proof and evidence of
the real value relation ... Every child knows that any nation that stopped
working –  I don't want to say for a year, but for a couple of weeks –
would perish miserably (verrecken) … Science is all  about developing
just how the law of value prevails.3 
For  a correct  understanding of  the value form,  in  my view it  is  crucial  to
understand  why Marx  introduces  value  form analysis  at  the  beginning  of
Capital set within the First Volume on the 'Production Process of Capital' and
not within the 'Circulation Process' of the Second Volume. This is indeed no
mistake in  the systematic  architecture  and method of  Capital,  but  exactly
3 Marx 1961, pp. 552-53. All translations from the original German and original Japanese reference literature 
quoted in this article are my own, except where otherwise indicated. 
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what Marx is trying to analyse: how value emerges as the dominant form in
which the specific character  of  labour in the capitalist  mode of  production
manifests itself. For Marx, value is not something that  emerges when two
commodity owners meet and exchange their respective commodities, but the
socially necessary form in which labour in capitalist societies expresses itself.
Value as socially necessary labour time emerges prior to exchange, even if in
exchange it is concretely realised in particular prices. 
I don't want to present a close reading of value form analysis at this point, but
to mediate between the more general topic that is value form analysis and the
specific form it takes in the debate between Japanese Marxian economists
Uno Kōzō and Kuruma Samezō, I want to quickly remind of what Marx had in
mind by opening his Opus Magnum with the question of value:
What Marx sets out to do with value form analysis is to answer the riddle of
money: why do all products of labour in societies where the capitalist mode of
production prevails necessarily express themselves in money form, a very
specific commodity? Money, according to Marx, exerts a particular “magic”
which consists in the strange fact that commodities find their own value form,
'in  its  finished  shape,  in  the  body  of  a  commodity  existing  outside and
alongside them.'4 In other words, what exactly makes all other commodities –
the  world  of  commodities  –  relate  themselves  to  money  as  their  general
4 Marx 2008, p. 107.
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equivalent? The key to the riddle of money Marx sees in the fact that gold and
silver 'as soon as they emerge from the bowels of the earth' become 'the
immediate  incarnation  of  all  human  labour.'5 Consequentially,  and  even
before Marx traces the developed form of value in money back to their logical
nucleus in the simple value expression 'x commodity A = y commodity B', his
inquiry  centers  around  the  condition  of  possibility  for  commodities,  their
production. Although every single commodity is the product of a specific kind
of concrete and useful labour (tailoring, weaving, software-programming or
tea picking), in the exchange of commodities, the concrete use-values of the
commodities and therefore the concrete and useful labour that was necessary
to  produce  to  commodities,  are  abstracted  from.  However,  what  makes
exchange possible is the feature that such different kinds of labour have in
common: to be products of the expenditure of abstract-homogeneous human
labour in a certain amount of average socially necessary labour time.6 This
Marx calls 'value'  –  not 'exchange value'  which only indicates the  ratio by
which different kinds of commodities are exchanged, but does not explain the
condition of possibility of exchange. So the common feature of commodities
to  be  not  products  of  any  kind  of  specific  labour,  but  to  be  products  of
homogeneous human labour  brings the value form and therefore also the
5 Ibid.
6 Critics of the labour theory of value like Uno, as we shall see later, at no point explain the tertium 
comparationis which makes the exchange of two completely different products of labour with two 
completely different use-values possible in the first place. 
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condition for the commodities' exchangeability about. The money form as the
fully developed form in which value exists – the foremost 'bearer of value' –
only masks its social character as the “reified form” of human labour, or as
Marx  puts  it,  it  has  a  'phantom-like  objectivity'  as  'social  substance'7.
Discovering this relation allows Marx to scientifically criticise the historically
specific mode of production of capitalist sociation (Vergesellschaftung) which
expresses itself in abstract homogeneous human labour: a society in which
the division of  labour  and its  private  character  prevail  (privat-arbeitsteilige
Produktion), and which necessarily leads to forms of commodity exchange.
Methodically, this level of abstraction is required to be able to criticise how the
law of value prevails, as Marx tells Kugelmann in his letter: in its forms of
commodification and exchange. 
In this essay, I want to focus on a debate on the value form between the
Marxian  economists  Kuruma  Samezō  (1893-1982)  and  Uno  Kōzō
(1897-1977) taking place in 1940s-1950s Japan. I aim to show why Uno's
interpretation  of  the  value  form  is  lacking  a  fundamental  insight  into  the
methodological  and  object-related  abstraction  the  value  form  requires.
Hereby  I  also  argue  that  Uno  overlooks  the  significance  of  value  which
corresponds to the daily performance of abstraction in the production process
that only manifests itself in the various acts of purchase and sale. My general
7 Marx 2008, p. 52.
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claim is that value bears the paradox of an  objective and logical existence
that is simultaneously socially constructed, and by which the capitalist mode
of production is able to take an autonomous form independent of the agents
within the process.8 My specific claim is that value form analysis (or 'theory')9
explains the logical genesis of money, the very form in which value manifests
itself and which operates independently of the thoughts, actions and wants of
the commodity owners. However, I abstain from a discussion of Uno's later
theorems such as the theory of crisis, or the problem of the commodification
of labour power since they have not been addressed or problematised within
the  value  form debate  with  Kuruma that  Uno  refers  to  in  his  1948  book
Studies in Capital (Shihonron kenkyū), and which he subsequently elaborated
on in his seminal work Principles of Political Theory (Keizai genron) (1950-52,
1964). A very recent publication by Gavin Walker10 has already stressed the
relevance  of  the  commodification  of  labour  power  within  Uno  theory  in
general, which is however not the subject of this paper. My research solely
concentrates on the debate on agency and Capital's 'self-processing'  logic
within the value form that have - at least to my knowledge - not yet come to
8 In this sense, Marx has coined the influential and much discussed term of 'objective forms of thought' 
(objektive Gedankenformen) (Marx 2008, p. 90). 
9 The concept of 'theory' is not favoured by me, since Marx in my view does not deduce value form from a 
specific ready-made theory that has to correspond to the 'facts' in a positivist sense. Marx's critique of the
bourgeois economic conceptualizations instead allows him to analyse what is already 'at work' in our 
thinking of the production process and makes us confront its inadequacies. The Japanese term however 
explicitly says 'value form theory' (kachikeitairon), which is why in English I sometimes also speak of 
'theory' instead of 'analysis'. 
10 Walker 2012, pp. 15-37. I refer to this work in a footnote further down the text.
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the attention of critical Uno research.
This  paper  therefore  seeks  to  draw  attention  to  a  theoretical  debate  in
post-war Japanese intellectual history that not only allows an understanding
of  the  development  of  'imported'  thought  in  Japan,  but  also  shows  how
Japanese  intellectuals  since  the  1950s  have  worked  on  and  elaborated
Marxist thought in their own fashion – with often astonishing results that have
sometimes even anticipated  'Western'  core  concepts  and  problems.11 The
debate between Uno and Kuruma on the significance of the value form is but
one, however an essential part of theoretical formation on Marxian thought
among Japanese theorists. 
Inter-War Marxian discussions and the Uno-Kuruma debate (1947-1956) 
Historians of Marxism like Jan Hoff in their latest works have remarked that 'in
no other capitalist country in the world has research on the Marxian critique of
political  economy  been  as  intensely  performed  as  in  Japan'12,  and  the
economist Oguro Masao (1942-) added that especially value form analysis
11 The core relevance of value form analysis for Marxist theory as such had been acknowledged in the late 
1960s by authors who would later become the Neue Marxlektüre, after the exclusive emphasis on the 
theorem of commodity fetishism and the 'exchange logic' of capital has somehow waned within Marxist 
circles, especially in Germany. The publication that may have initialized the re-evaluation of value form 
theory in a greater Marxian context and served as stimulus for the Neue Marxlektüre – of whom the 
protagonists, Helmut Reichelt and Hans-Georg Backhaus were Adorno's students – was Kritik der 
politischen Ökonomie heute. 100 Jahre Kapital. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt 1968 (edited by 
Alfred Schmidt). It also brought I.I. Rubin's early work Essays on Marx's Theory of Value (1928, re-edited
1973) to the attention of Marxian scholars in Western Germany. For a close historiography of the Neue 
Marxlektüre see Elbe 2008. 
12 Hoff 2008, p. 11.
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has been the topic of hundreds of publications since World War II in Japan.13 
As a matter of fact, 'outstanding contribution[s]'14 to Marxian political economy
were only made after the war when systematic repression of Marxist-Marxian
thought was abolished together with the military state. In the inter-war years,
the  'debate  on  Japanese  capitalism'  between  1927  and  1937  dominated
Marxist  circles  after  growing criticism of  the Russian Revolution began to
challenge the idea of  the socialist  revolution in  the Japanese case.15 The
protagonists of the debate either emerged from a loose entanglement with the
anarcho-syndicalist and socialist movements of the late Meiji era (1868-1912)
like Yamakawa Hitoshi (1880-1958), or, like Yamada Moritarō (1897-1980),
were more more prone to Marxism-Leninism as was then often identified with
'real' Marxism. In the years after the founding of the Japanese Communist
Party (Nihon kyōsantō) in 1922, the debate on Japanese capitalism emerged
as  an  inner-party  debate  in  as  how  to  correctly  evaluate  the  Meiji
restoration16:  either  as  a  bourgeois  revolution  that,  with  the  growing
expansion  of  capitalist  heavy  industry  and  the  expected  roll  back  of  the
traditional agrarian sector would automatically lead to the elimination of all
13 See Oguro 1986, p. 24.
14 Hoston 1986, p. 35.
15 I do not intend to give an exhaustive overview of inter- or post war Marxist debates in Japan, nor of the 
debate on Japanese capitalism. However, to put the Uno-Kuruma-debate into a, if somehow abridged, 
historical framework, the mentioning of a few names and doctrines may be useful. The richness of the 
debates can in no way be reflected within the scope of this paper. 
16 The abolishment of the Tokugawa clan's feudal state and the reinstallation of the Emperor system 
between 1867-69 is generally referred to as the Meiji restoration (Meiji ishin). 
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feudal  remnants (the so-called 'theory of  a  one-step revolution'  ichidankai
kakumei  ron),  or  as  an  incomplete,  if  not  failed attempt  to  establish  a
bourgeois-capitalist  state  which  instead  called  for  a  so-called  two  stage
revolution,  the  nidankai kakumei:  first,  the  establishment  of  a
bourgeois-democratic  state  modelled  after  Western  European  developed
capitalist  states,  second,  its  overcoming  by  the  proletarian,  the  final
revolution.  The  Kōza-ha (Lectures-group)17,  who supported the latter  view,
remained loyal to the JCP and the Comintern theses on Japanese Capitalism
which  saw  Japan  as  an  economically  underdeveloped  country,  whereas
Yamakawa's  Rōnō-ha (labour-farmer-group) even seceded from the JCP in
1927  to  form  a  powerful  and  influential  'non-Communist  party  Marxist
group'18. It launched its attacks against the party line in its journal Rōnō that
had been founded immediately after the split with the JCP in December 1927
and gave the group its name. The Kōza-ha as well  as the Rōnō-ha were
exposed to severe persecution by the military state between 1928 and 1937.
In  1937,  more  than  400  members  of  the  Rōnō-ha,  mostly  university
professors, were arrested – among them Sakisaka Itsurō, a close associate
17 The publication that gave the Kōza-ha its name was the 7-volume Lectures on the History of the 
Development of Japanese Capitalism (Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu shi kōza), which was modelled after a 
Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Japanese history in accordance with the Comintern theses from 1927 
and, partly, 1932. It was published by the prestigious Iwanami shoten publishing house in 1932-33. For a 
detailed discussion of the appropriation of the Comintern theses into the JCP's view of Japanese history 
and its divergences, see Furihata 1987 (in German). 
18 Hoston 1986, p. 38. For a good overview of the Kōza-ha-Rōnō-ha debate, see Hoston 1986, pp. 35-75; 
Sugihara 1987, pp. 27 ff.; Itō 1980, pp. 22 ff.; Gayle 2003, pp. 24 ff.; Hoff 2008, pp. 48-52.
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of Uno Kōzō and co-author of some of his works. Uno himself was close to, if
not a direct member of the Rōnō faction before the war. 
The debate on Japanese capitalism however, though marking a 'watershed' in
the  development  of  inner-Japanese  debates  on  Marx,  was  yet  somehow
marred  by  its  particularist-regionalist  character.  For  a  more  sophisticated
approach in Marxian theory, especially with regard to a philological reading of
Capital, Fukumoto Kazuo (1894-1983) should be mentioned. Fukumoto who
had a  background in  Hegelian  Marxism,  studied  in  Germany's  Jena from
1922-3  where  he  took  part  in  the  Marxistische  Arbeitswoche  –  the  first
convention of the newly founded Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung – and
became acquainted with both Georg Lukács and Karl Korsch. Back in Japan,
he became a leading member in the JCP, together with his political adversary
Yamakawa, until his expulsion in 1927. In his research, Fukumoto focused on
the  methodological  re-evalution  of  the  problem  of  presentation  in  the
beginning  of  Capital,  including  his  strong  emphasis  on  the  importance  of
value form theory which he saw as a 'combination of analytical abstraction
and  synthetic  construction'19. His  1920s  dispute  with  Kawakami  Hajime
(1879-1946) over the scope and role of value form theory within the Critique
of Political Economy – Kawakami was another influential Marxist who also
translated Marx's  Wage labour  and Capital and  Value,  Price and Profit  in
19 Hoff 2008, p. 98. See Fukumoto 1926. 
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1921 and wrote and edited several works on economy critique in the 1920s20
–  presumably  also  had  an  influence  on  Uno  Kōzō.21 Stimulated  by
Böhm-Bawerks  criticism  of  the  labour  theory  of  value  and  the  growing
influence of the Japanese Verein für Sozialpolitik (shakai seisaku gakkai), an
anti-Marxist,  liberal  economic  association  influenced  by  the  German
economists Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917) and Lujo Brentano (1844-1931),
Japanese Marxists in the 1920s saw themselves forced to re-examine and
defend the labour theory of value. Kawakami's attempt at trying to 'create a
universal  and immutable  theory  of  value that  applied to  all  things and all
times'22 was however subject to critical responses in Fukumoto, Yamakawa
and  Kawakami's  critical  disciple  Kushida  Tamizō  (1885-1934)  alike.
Nonetheless,  thanks  to  Fukumoto's,  Kawakami's23 and  Kushida's24
contributions to value theory within Japanese Marxism in the late 1920s and
its subsequent criticism, we are witness to a rich tradition of debates on the
value theory of labour in a non-Western country that after its silencing and
20 Marx's and Engels' works have been translated into Japanese from the early 1900s on. A translation of 
the Communist Manifesto appeared 1904 in the first anniversary edition of the Heimin Shinbun ('The 
Commoner's News'), a weekly journal founded by the early Meiji socialist Kōtoku Shūsui who also 
translated it. Kōtoku later moved away from socialism to become an anarchist. In 1911, he and eleven 
other revolutionaries were found guilty of trying to assassinate the Emperor and subsequently executed. 
The following 'winter years' of Japanese Marxism that eventually not only paralyzed the socialist 
movement, but also theoretical endeavors in Marx exegesis, were succeeded by a new interest in 
Marxian works triggered by the Russian Revolution. The first Japanese translation of the first volume of 
Capital (in Japanese: Shihon ron) by Takabatake Motoyuki (1886-1928) was published in June 1920 by 
Kaizōsha, followed by volumes 2 and 3 in 1924. A short summary of all three volumes of Capital was 
however presented to the public in the Ōsaka edition of the Heimin Shinbun by Yamakawa as early as 
1907.
21 I am indebted to Jan Hoff for this assumption.
22 Morris-Suzuki 1989, p. 80. See Hoff 2008, p. 97. 
23 See Kawakami 1928. 
24 See Kushida 1947.
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repression during  the  years  of  ultranationalism and war  began to  flourish
again after 1945.
To draw attention to one crucial debate right after the war, I will present the
confrontation between Kuruma Samezō, then professor for political economy
at Hōsei University in Tokyo, and possibly the best known Marxian economist
of his time, Uno Kōzō, then professor for economy at the University of Tokyo.
It began at the professors' first encounter in 1947 and was further developed
in a series of critical essays Kuruma published between 1950 and 1956.25
Kuruma's criticism was successively directed against three arguments Uno
made  in  his  book  (co-authored  with  Sakisaka  Itsurō)  Shihon-ron  kenkyû
(Studies in Capital), published in 1948. However, his first encounter with Uno
that took place at a study meeting organized by the quarterly Hyōron in 1947
had  already  set  off  the  confrontation  of  their  two  irreconcilable  positions
regarding the correct interpretation of the value form.26
25 Kuruma's 1957 book Value Form Theory and Theory of the Exchange Process (Kachikeitairon to 
kōkankateiron) contained all previously published articles in condensed form, plus an excellent 
interpretation of the methodological relation between value form theory and theory of the exchange 
process. See Kuruma 1957. 
26 The scope of this paper unfortunately will not allow me an in-depth analysis of Uno's critique of the 
methodical setting of the labour theory of value in Capital, vol. 1, undertaken in his seminal work Keizai 
Genron (Principles of Political Economy, 1964 [1950-2]). In the book's introduction, Uno clearly dismisses
the production process as not being the foundation of commodity economy (Uno 1964, p. 16). I will 
shortly return to this point later. Furthermore, Uno's famous theory of three stages of the study of political 
economy would have to be methodologically criticised. According to this fundamental methodological 
approach characterising the Uno school as a whole, the science of political economy can only be 
correctly understood in connection of three different levels of abstraction, which are individually 
insufficient to explain the character of capitalist commodity economy and complement each other: the 
'pure'/'principal' theory of Capitalism (genriron) (as found in Marx's Capital), the 'developmental 
stages'-theory (dankairon) of capitalism's historical development (mercantilism, liberalism and 
imperialism), and the empirical analysis of the actual events (genjō bunseki). The stages theory here 
13
Let me present Kuruma's first impression of his rival-to-be, Uno, from one of
the Hyōron study meetings:
This time, the discussion leader explained the difference between two
interpretations of  the theory of  the exchange process (kōkankateiron),
that  is,  whether  the want  of  the commodity  owner  or  the role  of  the
commodity  owner  should  be  included  in  the  reflection  (kōsatsu  no
han'inai ni haitte kuru) or whether in value form theory (kachikeitairon)
they should be abstracted from (shashō sarete iru). So the discussion
centered around the question if value form theory could be understood in
abstraction from the want of the commodity owner. The majority of the
discussants, including me, concurred with the discussion leader that it
could,  but  Professor  Uno  was  of  a  different  opinion  and  obstinately
maintained that value form theory could not be understood in abstraction
from the want of the commodity owner. Different arguments have been
raised, but eventually the discussion dissipated without a solution.27   
Neither Uno nor Kuruma have revised their position in the following years.
allegedly serves as a mediator between the pure theory and empirical analysis (see Uno 1964, p.15). 
One obvious methodological objection is the following: what is the nexus of the theory that all three 
'levels' of the theory share, and how does it account for or justify the various forms of abstraction 
undertaken on each level? While I must omit a discussion of this problem in this paper, my post doctoral 
research project based on Uno will also elaborate on this point. 
27 Kuruma 1957, p. 3.
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Even ten years later, the latter systematically reflected on and summarized
the debate between Uno and himself about the correct interpretation of the
value  form in  his  work  Value  Form Theory  and  Theory  of  the  Exchange
Process (Kachikeitairon  to  kōkankateiron),  where  he  still  felt  the  need  to
confront Uno's position with his own.28 
Probably also because it wasn't until 2008 that the book was translated into
English29,  the  influence  of  and  response  to  Kuruma's  works  were  almost
completely overshadowed by the reception of Uno inside and outside Japan,
starting in the early 1970s. Thanks to Thomas T. Sekine's (1933-) translation
of  Uno's  seminal  work  Principles  of  Political  Economy (Keizai  genron)  in
198030,  and  his  and  Itō  Makoto's  (1936-)  commitment  to  making  Uno's
thought popular in the West through a vast array of books and articles on
value form theory as seen by Uno31,  the Uno School of Marxian economy
28 Kuruma's early book is based on three articles of which each is a refutation of one of Uno's arguments, 
successively published in Keizai shirin in January 1950 (vol. 18, no.1), July 1950 (vol.18., no. 3), and 
January 1951 (vol. 19, no. 1). The fourth and last article was to be published in the spring of 1951, but 
due to Kuruma's poor health, the article had to be delayed until 1956 (Keizai shirin vol. 24, no. 4). The 
first part (zenpen) of Value Form Theory and Theory of the Exchange Process mainly consists of the 
1956 article, the latter half of the book (kōhen) is based on the first three articles from 1950-1951. Uno 
himself published a single reply to Kuruma's first criticism in Keizai Hyōron in July 1950, which is 
accordingly criticised again in the latter part of Kuruma's book. See Uno 1950. 
29 See Kuruma 2008.
30 Keizai genron was originally published in two volumes in 1950 and 1952 by Iwanami shoten. An abridged
version was made available in 1964, also by Iwanami. Sekine's translation is based on the 1964 version. 
31 Though by no means an exhaustive overview of referential literature by Sekine or Itō can be given here, 
a small selection of what may be representative for Uno School thought available in English should at 
least be mentioned. Works by Thomas T. Sekine: 'Uno-riron: A Japanese Contribution to Marxian Political
Economy', Journal of Economic Literature 13:3, 1975, pp. 847-77; 'The necessity of the Law of Value', 
Science and Society 44:3 (Fall 1980), pp. 289-304; 'The Circular Motion of Capital', Science and Society 
45:3 (Fall 1981), pp. 288-305. His books A Japanese Approach to Political Economy. Unoist Variations 
(New York: Macmillan 1995) and An Outline of the Dialectic of Capital in two volumes (New York: 
Macmillan 1997) as well as Itō Makoto's Value and Crisis (New York and London: Monthly Review Press 
1980) also belong to the referential canon of the Uno School originally written in English by Japanese 
authors. 
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became one of the most influential non-Western schools of economic thought
worldwide.32 Sekine's  translation  of  Keizai  Genron was  especially  widely
received in US-Canadian Marx research, not least because by his affiliation
with the York University Economics Department where he taught for several
years, he was able to gather a group of ardent followers who contributed to
his and Uno's work from a background in US- and Canadian academia.33
Uno's ideas were recently also contextualized within the Neue Marxlektüre of
Hans-Georg  Backhaus  and  Helmut  Reichelt34,  both  former  students  of
Theodor W. Adorno35, though for reasons of space within the context of this
essay, I  must  abstain  from arguing why supposing a  theoretical  proximity
between Uno theory and the German Neue Marxlektüre is highly problematic,
and even unsound.36
32 For a good historical overview of the emergence of the Uno School from the remnants of the Kōza-ha 
and Rōnō-ha debates in Japan, see Barshay 2004, pp. 92-119. 
33 See Albritton 1986, and Albritton/Sekine 1995. See also Bell 2009. 
34 References to the Neue Marxlektüre have also gained momentum in Japanese Marxian economics since
the 1980s. Subtle theoretical differences nonwithstanding, economists like Masaki 1986, and 1992; 
Ebitsuka 1984, Kataoka 1994, Mukai 1995, and Umezawa 1991, and 1997, have all contributed to the 
problem of the genesis of money in relation to fetishization and partly also discussed Backhaus, Reichelt 
and Heinrich. Especially Masaki Hachirō's method of a close textual exegesis of value form theory, 
comparing the Grundrisse and the first with the later editions of Capital draws on Reichelt's demand for 
clarity through intense philological study. Masaki who spent time doing his research at the University of 
Bremen in the 1980s where he worked closely with Reichelt, may have also exerted a certain influence 
on his German colleague by bringing him in contact with Uno theory. 
35 See Kubota 2009.
36 As will be clearer in the discussion of the debate between Uno and Kuruma, in this essay I rely on the 
works of Backhaus 1997, Reichelt 2001, and Heinrich 1999 although I am also aware of the ambiguities 
especially in Heinrich's conception of the emergence of value in the exchange process – his claim that 
value 'only exists in the social relations of commodities, and therefore only in exchange' (Heinrich 1999, 
p. 216, my translation), and his simultaneous claim that Marx was right in emphasizing that commodities 
do not have a value because of their exchangeability (Heinrich 1999, p. 232 n.). Heinrich's approach of a 
monetary theory of value however strikes me as correctly evaluating money's genesis at the beginning of
Capital as a structural, not a historical, one. For a recent critical discussion of both the monetary and the 
'pre-monetary' theory of value of Wolfgang Fritz Haug, see Robert Kurz' last work at Kurz 2012.
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Kuruma on the other hand never had the international response Uno had,
though  with  his  (Kuruma's)  Marx-Lexikon  zur  politischen  Ökonomie37 (an
encyclopedia containing all the main concepts of Marx's critique of political
economy, both in German and Japanese), he gained some attention within
German Marxist circles in the 1970s-1980s. Kuruma's adherence to a faithful
reading  of  Marx's  texts,  underscoring  closeness  to  the  original,  and  his
reluctance to 'read something into a text that isn't there', as his critique of Uno
can be generally characterised, made him a rather inaccessible author for
post-World War readers of  Marx who yearned for  new interpretations and
innovative  approaches  to  the  classical  Marxist  texts,  combined  with
alternatives to Party-line interpretations of Marx. Though neither Kuruma nor
Uno were Party members and both radically critical of so-called traditional
Marxism,  only  Uno was able  to  satisfy  the  academic  need for  'clear  and
consistent answers to all the fundamental issues of Marxist theory'38 - and its
overall reconstruction.
Uno's understanding of the value form and Kuruma's reply 
Though the scope of essay, as mentioned earlier, will not allow for an in-depth
study of the theoretical and methodological suppositions of Uno's later work
Keizai Genron, his reconstruction of Marxist theory undertaken in this work
37 See Kuruma 1973, and 1977
38 Albritton 1986, p. 2.
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can be seen as a critique of the labour theory of value from the standpoint of
circulation. The seed of  this  criticism was however  already planted in  the
debate with Kuruma that I present in this essay. Accordingly, Uno's insistence
on the want of the commodity owner for understanding Marx's theory of the
value form and consequentially how value is possible, could be seen as the
miniature form of  this criticism. It  will  soon be clear that the standpoint  of
exchange or circulation that Uno takes disregards a fundamental feature of
Marx's  criticism of  the form of  labour in  capitalist  societies:  the feature of
fetishistic  reification  already at  work in  the exchange process.  I  will  come
back to this point later. First, let me present how Uno reads value form theory
within the problematic of commodity exchange.
Uno's  main  three  arguments  in  support  of  his  view  that  the  want  of  the
commodity owner cannot be abstracted from if we want to understand the
simple value expression x commodity A = y commodity B (which can be also
expressed as: x commodity A is worth y commodity B), or 20 yards of linen
are worth 1 coat, where the linen is in the relative form of value and the coat
is in the equivalent value form, could be summarised as follows:
1) In the simple form of value, the question why a particular commodity is
in the equivalent form cannot be understood without taking into account
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the want of the owner of the commodity in the relative form. It is thus
mistaken to think that the role played by the want of the commodity
owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value form.39
2) Without  considering  the  commodity  owner,  it  is  not  possible  to
understand why the commodity in the relative form of  value and the
commodity in the equivalent form are each in their respective forms.
The demand for the active expression of value is the demand of the
commodity owner, and a certain commodity is in the relative form of
value because of the existence of the commodity owner. 'If there were
no owner of the linen, for example, there would also not be any desire
for the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form, which is the
coat.'40 'Even in the case of the simple value-form, the commodity in the
relative value-form and the commodity in the equivalent form are not in
a relation of simple equality'41,  but mediated through the want of the
owner  of  the commodity  in  the relative  form of  value (linen)  for  the
commodity in the equivalent form of value (coat).42 
3) The essential difference between the general equivalent form (form C)
and the money form (form D) first becomes clear when we consider the
want  of  the commodity  owner. That  is,  when the general  equivalent
39 See Kuruma 2008, p. 73. Original references: Uno and Sakisaka 1948, pp. 142, 157, 159, 160.
40 Uno and Sakisaka 1948, p. 166.
41 Uno and Sakisaka 1948, pp. 233-34.
42 See Kuruma 2008, p. 95.
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becomes money it is no longer limited to the relation where it is desired
for  its  original  use-value,  and  thus  it  expresses  the  value  of  a
commodity.  Only  if  we  'suppose  the  existence  of  the  owner  of  the
commodity in  the relative value-form, we can understand that  in the
case of the money form a change occurs so that the liberation from its
use-value is completed, whereas this has still only been latent in the
case of the general value-form.'43
Kuruma replies to and probably also successfully refutes all three arguments
individually.  However,  instead  of  simply  repeating  Kuruma's
counter-arguments, I want to draw attention to the wider intention of what in
Kuruma's reading Marx actually tried to explain with value form theory and
what methodological presuppositions are required to understand it. By doing
this,  Kuruma's  position  can  be  rightly  assessed  as  a  methodological
intervention and Uno's 'failed abstraction' more precisely be understood.
That Uno insists on the want of the commodity owner as a heuristic tool to
43 Uno and Sakisaka 1948, p. 164. See also Kuruma 2008, p. 113. Uno's overall rejection of the 'substance'
or labour theory of value – and consequentially his somehow twisted understanding of Marx's radical 
break with classical political economy – is probably best reflected in the following excerpt from the same 
book: 'The abstraction of value from the exchange relation between two commodities discarding their 
owners is similar to the abstraction of fruit from pear and apple […] We must comprehend the relation 
between two commodities subjectively from the viewpoint of the linen owner, not objectively apart from 
both owners. If we start with such a formalistic abstraction as commodity linen and commodity coat to 
have something in common (a third which is neither linen nor coat), it is difficult to understand the true 
meaning that the linen is in the relative from with the coat in the equivalent form.” Uno 1948, p. 178, 
emphasis added. However, to ignore the 'formalistic abstraction' of reified human expenditure of labour 
power means to ignore the whole idea of Capital, I claim: why in societies in which the capitalist mode of 
production prevails, human labour necessarily takes the form of value – the very condition under which 
commodities ('bearers of value') could be and are matter-of-factly exchanged. 
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understand value form theory in Kuruma's view concerns a  methodological
problem. It must therefore be asked why Marx indeed analyses value form
independently of  the  wants  and  actions  of  the  agents  in  the  exchange
process.  Commodity owners are first  considered in  the second chapter of
Capital vol.  1,  'The Exchange Process',  whereas the genesis of  money is
already completely deduced in chapter one, 'The Commodity'. According to
Marx,  money organizes the sale and purchase of  products by solving the
contradiction between value and use-value in the exchange process: money
mediates the commodity owners' individual want for a specific use-value with
the general social want for value where the mediation of private with general
labour embodied in a particular commodity has already taken place. Money
can  therefore  rightfully  be  called  the  'transcendental  synthesis'  of  a
commodity producing society. 
However, whereas Marx declares money as the mediator of use-value and
value, Kuruma emphasizes the specific methodological questions that lead to
this  insight.  The  specific  questions  that  lead  the  analysis  in  the  first  and
second chapters are indispensable for a correct understanding of the relation
between  the  specific  acts  of  the  commodity  owners  and  the  specific
preconditions  that  make  their  acts  possible.  Kuruma's  view  is  that,
paradoxically, it  is  not  the  act  of  exchange that  determines  the  theory  of
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value,  but  on  the  contrary,  the  theory of  value determines  the  act  of
exchange. 44 What could Kuruma possibly mean by this? 
To  put  his  counterargument  in  the  wider  setting  of  the  methodological
structure of Capital, Kuruma strongly emphasizes the method of the first three
chapters.  According  to  Marx's  claim  that  'the  difficulty  lies  not  in
comprehending that money is a commodity, but how, why and through what a
commodity  becomes  money'45,  Kuruma  sees  a  division  at  work  in  the
systematic structure of the first two chapters: value form analysis in Section 3
of the first chapter of Capital, 'The Commodity', looks at the how (ika ni shite)
of money, section 4, 'The Fetish Character of the Commodity and its Secret'
examines the  why  (naze ni) of money, and in the second chapter on 'The
Exchange Process', Marx looks at the through what (nani ni yotte) of money.46
The exchange process as a social process that first puts commodities into
practical  relation  is  however  strongly  related  to  value  form  analysis.  But
whereas value form analysis, as Kuruma says, 'answers the question  how
gold as a specific commodity can become the general equivalent, so that its
natural  form  counts  as  value  in  the  whole  world  of  commodities'47,  the
question is  here  not  through what this  takes place.  The 'practical  side'  of
money  is  shown  in  the  exchange  process.  However,  to  Kuruma  the
44 Kuruma 1957, pp. 24-5. I will quote the passage in full length further down.
45 Marx 2008, p. 107.
46 Kuruma 1957, p. 40.
47 Kuruma 1957, pp. 20-1.
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differentiation between the  function of value form analysis and the  practical
act of putting commodities into relation is vital for clarifying the overall basic
intention of Marx's value theory. This is how Kuruma arrives at the conclusion
that,  although in the theory of  the exchange process the necessity of  the
mediating 'nature'  of money is practically reproduced, the mediation of the
two different commodities has already taken place: through abstraction from
the  specific  form  of  labour  that  was  necessary  to  produce  different
use-values. Money is the magical substance in which this abstraction gains
'phantom-like  objectivity'  (gespenstige  Gegenständlichkeit)48.  Kuruma
therefore maintains that the confrontation of commodities and their owners for
the  purpose  of  exchange  in  a  general  social,  and  not  only  coincidental
manner, is only possible on the basis of the general equivalent of money, so
that money is not generated  by exchange.  General social exchange is only
possible if money as a reified product of abstraction already exists.49 But how
can the law of value embodied in money be the  precondition under which
48 Marx 2008, p. 52.
49 Here it should also be clear that Uno with his insistence on the genesis of money through exchange 
comes very close to the traditional Marxist – that is, Engelsian – view of value form analysis as a 
historical development of money starting from 'simple commodity production/exchange' in primitive 
societies, which came to be known as the “logical-historical” method of orthodox Marxism. That this is not
at all what Marx had in mind when he was exclusively writing about capitalist sociation, is widely 
recognized in the meantime. Reichelt (2001), Heinrich (1999) and Backhaus (1997) have contributed to a
critique of the standard interpretation, and Rakowitz (2000) has devoted the better part of her research to
a critique of the Engelsian view. The logical reconstruction of the money form in the third chapter of 
Capital shows how the gold commodity is itself the incarnation of human labour which in its essence 
hides its relation to labour. According to Rakowitz, the sphere of circulation falls victim to this relation and
becomes itself reified and ideological. On the matter of the transhistoricity of the law of value however, 
Uno is more outspoken. In one later writing from 1958, Uno clearly dismisses the theory of a 
transhistorical law of value as seen by Stalin. See Barshay (2004), p. 122 and Uno (1958/1974), p. 119. 
In Uno's view, value will disappear with the disppearance of a capitalist commodity economy. 
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commodity owners think and act?
Marx's own ideas regarding the consciousness of the commodity owners are
not specifically elaborated. To him, the logical analysis of money that can be
reduced  to  the  nucleus  of  simple  value  expression  (x  commodity  A =  y
commodity B), does not raise questions with regard to the consciousness of
the commodity  owners.  In  the Fetish  Chapter  however, he addresses the
daily  abstraction  from the production process  taking place in  exchange –
'They don't know it, yet they do it'50 –  but in what way commodity owners
really only perform an act inasmuch as they are not conscious of it, is not
further  developed by Marx.51 On the contrary, he seems to  presuppose a
subject-less, automatic gesture in the exchange process. The conspicuous
absence of agents in value form analysis as well as in the whole chapter on
the commodity in my view is likewise itself a methodological tool to express
the reified structures of given processes. In doing so, Marx is well aware of
the  curiosity  of  a  mediation  that  already  has  taken  place  (money  as  the
immediate incarnation of abstract human labour) which is simultaneously the
precondition for a performative act (commodity exchange):
50 Marx 2008, p. 88.
51 Alfred Sohn-Rethel developed the idea of Realabstraktion (real abstraction) in his seminal work Geistige 
und körperliche Arbeit (Intellectual and Manual Labour) in 1970, although the concept was already 
integrated in his thought since the 1930s. Realabstraktion is a kind of abstraction not performed in 
thought, but in action, i.e., the daily act of commodity exchange. In my view, the concept is already 
latently at work in the Fetish Chapter in Capital. For reasons I cannot further elabourate on here, 
Sohn-Rethel sees abstraction as the result of the exchange process, not the production process. For a 
critical response, see my paper 'Transcendental Materialism: Contrasting Alfred Sohn-Rethel's materialist
epistemology with Adorno's reading of the Kantian Ding an sich', presented at the International 
Conference Critical Matter, Frankfurt 2012, available through elena.lange@aoi.uzh.ch.
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In their dilemma, our commodity owners think like Faust. In the beginning
was the deed. They have therefore already acted before thinking.  The
laws of commodity nature act upon the natural instinct of the commodity
owners. They can only relate their commodities to each other as values
and therefore as commodities, if they place them in a polar relationship
to another commodity as general equivalent. We concluded this from the
analysis of the commodity. But only a social deed can turn one specific
commodity into the general equivalent.52
In short, value form analysis has already proven the necessity of money as
the general  equivalent  (the  how of  money),  whereas only the social  deed
endues  the  gold  commodity  with  these  properties  (the  through  what of
money). Uno's interpretation that sees not the logic of value, but the individual
acts  of  the commodity  owners as the driving force behind the genesis  of
money, overlooks this fine methodological nuance, which is in turn crucial to
understand the autonomous, independent forms that commodity production
and exchange generate.  Uno is  simultaneously  very  outspoken about  his
claim to reconstruct value form theory by replacing it with the analysis of the
exchange  process.  Like  the  other  circulation  theorists  in  the  debate,  as
52 Marx 2008, p. 101. Emphasis added.
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Kuruma informs us, Uno maintained that Marx has declared his 'theoretical
bankruptcy' (rironteki hasan), since value form analysis could not solve the
contradiction between use-value and value. That is why Marx was allegedly
forced to use the stopgap of introducing the  practice of commodity owners
within the theory of value. Kuruma resolutely repudiates this reading:
It is in no way true that Marx maintains that a 'theoretically unsolvable
problem'  is  solved  through  a  particular  kind  of  action  (commodity
exchange). Quite to the contrary: commodity owners act  according to
theory. 'The laws of commodity nature act upon the natural instinct of the
commodity  owners.' It  is  a  matter  of  fact  that  the  contradiction  of
use-value and value must be confronted, before money is there to solve
it. But that is just why the commodity owners unwillingly act according to
what theory has already demonstrated (riron ga kakusureba kakunaru to
oshieru  toori  ni  kōdō  shite):  by  generating  money  indispensable  for
exchange.  Why  does  Marx  also  claim  that  they  'have  acted  before
thinking'? This is a cunning way to say that money like all other relation
in commodity production emerges spontaneously, not as a 'product of
reflection' or as a 'discovery' like the bourgeois economists declare.53   
53 Kuruma 1957, p. 24-5.
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The claim that commodity owners act 'according to what theory has already
demonstrated',  as  Kuruma  says,  can  lead  to  misinterpretation  however.  I
would  suggest  that  commodity  owners  act  according  to  the  law  of  value
(Wertgesetz), albeit unconsciously. The law of value – value as the structuring
force  of  social  exchange  –  can  therefore  rightfully  be  called  a  'logically
unconscious'  phenomenon:  it  is  objectively  valid  and  simultaneously
uncomprehended. In this view, commodity exchange becomes pure activity
where all theoretical speculation is suspended.
Yet there is another argument Kuruma reminds Uno of to show how Marx
underscores  the  self-movement  of  capital,  instead  of  that  of  allegedly
autonomous and rational people in commodity exchange. Contrary to what
happens in exchange in our 'natural view' of the process – for example, two
people  exchanging  their  commodities,  because  one  person  needs/wants
something the other one has and which he/she is ready to give away for the
thing the other person needs/wants – exchange is not carried out by people
and still less by their desires, but by the commodities themselves who in their
own  'commodity  language'54 communicate  their  relations  without  any
intervention by the commodity owners. To be sure, Marx' language here is
metaphorical, but it must be understood as a strong criticism of the fetishized
forms of circulation that result from the concealment nexus between labour,
54 Marx 2008, p. 66.
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commodity and money. Kuruma accordingly maintains:
The process [by which the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent
form takes on the form of value in the relative form of value] is taking
place  independently  of  the  consciousness  of  the  commodity  owners.
Instead of a human being, the commodity becomes the subject (shutai),
and instead of human language, in this fetishistic world the language of
commodities (shōhingo) is spoken.55 
In  the last  section,  I  aim to embed the strange abstractions of  value that
almost gain an anti-anthropomorphic quality in a discussion of the problem of
fetishisation.  In my view Uno's negligence of  the complex of  the fetish as
early as in his debate with Kuruma has led to a truncated interpretation of the
value form in his own later works as well as those of the Uno School.
Recapitulating Value Abstraction as Fetish
The riddle  of  money that  was addressed above consists  exactly  in  every
55 Kuruma 1957, p. 82. The corresponding passage in Marx is the following: 'We see then that everything 
the analysis of commodity value told us before, is told by the linen itself, as soon as it interacts with 
another commodity, the coat. Except that it reveals its own thoughts in the only language it is familiar 
with, the language of commodities. In order to say that its own value is created by labour in its abstract 
quality of being human labour, it says that the coat, in so far as it counts as its (the linen's) own equal, 
therefore being value, consists of the same labour as the linen does itself. In order to say that its sublime 
value-materiality [Wertgegenständlichkeit] is different from its materiality as a stiff canvas-like body, it 
says that value looks like a coat, and therefore – in so far the linen itself is a value-thing – it and the coat 
are alike as two peas.' Marx 2008, p. 67.
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single  commodity's  (potential  and  factual)  value  expression  in  a  different
commodity existing 'outside and alongside' of it: money. Only the abstraction
from  the  concrete  and  useful  labour  manifested  in  the  various  different
commodities to homogeneous human labour makes exchangeability possible.
By  the  exchangeability  of  two  completely  different  products  of  labour, the
labour manifested in the commodity that is in the equivalent form becomes
the incarnation or materialisation of value for the commodity that is in the
relative form of value. It its completely developed and reified form, this labour
becomes money. Money does not  'leave  a  trace'56 of  its  own genesis   –
therein consists its magic. However, if  we want to understand the magical
character of money and value as the concealment of the social character of
labour in capitalist societies, we have to take a short look at how exactly a
commodity  becomes  money, in  other  words:  we  have  to  recapitulate  the
emergence of value abstraction as a fetish.
Confronting the simple value expression x commodity A = y commodity B (20
yards of linen = 1 coat),  Marx tells us in the first  edition of  Capital that it
already  contains  the  'secret  of  the value form,  and therefore,  in  nuce,  of
money.'57 This seemingly simple equation, 'of which its analysis presents the
real difficulty'58, shows nothing less than the logical kernel of money, or the
56 Marx 2008, p. 107.
57 Marx 1983, p. 32.
58 Marx 2008, p. 63.
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'skeleton' of the money relation. The following four conclusions can be drawn
from simple value expression:
First, 20 yards of linen cannot express their own value in another 20 yards of
linen. This would be tautological in the Hegelian sense, saying 'nothing'59. The
commodity  of  linen must  therefore  place itself  in  relation to  an altogether
different commodity. This is how it becomes the relative expression of value,
since it actively assumes to role of the commodity that wants to know its own
value. It is the use-value of the other commodity (for example, one coat) that
linen then actively poses as its own value-expression. Accordingly, the linen
ascribes  the  role  of  the  equivalent  form  of  value  to  the  coat.  The  linen
assumes the active, the coat the passive expression of value. We can already
see  how  this  relation,  simple  at  first  sight,  contains  presuppositions  not
immediately observable.
Second, by equating one coat to itself (20 yards of linen) to find out its own
value60, the linen does not relate to itself directly, but only by the 'detour' of the
coat whose use-value suddenly counts as the value expression of the linen.
59 'That is to say that if, for example, to the question “what is a plant?”, the answer is “a plant is – a plant”, 
the truth of this sentence is readily admitted by the whole society it has been tried on, and it is likewise 
concordantly admitted that nothing is said by it.' Hegel 1986, p. 43. 
60 Kuruma here points to a fundamental mistake in the Japanese translations of Capital by Hasebe Fumio 
and Miyakawa Minoru respectively. Both in their Japanese translations do not convey that it is the linen 
that assumes the active role by equating the coat to itself. In the first edition of Capital, Marx says: 
'Qualitatively, it [the linen] equates the coat to itself.' Marx 1983, p. 29, emphasis added. In Hasebe's 
translation, we read: 'Qualitatively, the linen equates itself to the coat (shitsutekini rinneru ga mizukara 
wo uwagi ni tōchi suru).' Marx 1929, p. 53. In Miyakawa's translation, we read: 'The linen equates itself to
the coat qualitatively (rinneru ga mizukara wo uwagi ni shitsuteki ni hitoshi to suru).' Marx 1946, p. 253. 
See also Kuruma 1957, pp. 58-9.
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This is how linen “differentiates itself from its own use-value” (Marx 1983: 29)
and impresses a new form and function onto the coat,  which in its 'bodily
existence' becomes the object-like form of the linen's  value. In other words,
the  labour  manifested  in  the  coat  becomes  the  value  expression  for  the
labour manifested in the linen.
Third, by equating the coat to itself as value, the linen assumes an object-like
value form which presents itself as the natural form of the coat. The linen thus
becomes the commodity form that has the value form of a coat. Exchange
reveals its unnatural character at this point: that one commodity assumes the
value  of  another  completely  overrides  the  logic  of  any  person's  interests,
desires, or wants for the specific use-value of one commodity. By being the
products of private labour that have to gain a meaningful existence through
their relation to general and abstract human labour, with the fact of the 'whole
world of commodities' (not just linen and coats) as its direct manifestation, the
self-estrangement of the products of concrete and useful labour has already
taken place when commodity owners enter the exchange process. It is only
by  abstraction from concrete labour that commodities can be meaningfully
exchanged. By being exchanged, commodities mediate abstract and general
human labour which,  under the forms of capitalist value production, cannot
do otherwise than be socially mediated.
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Probably this becomes clearer when we look at the fourth conclusion: the
natural form of the coat assumes the quality of immediate exchangeability
with any other commodity, that is, equivalent form which contains the logical
kernel of money. In the simple value expression, the dialectical relation of
non-materiality  and  its  material  manifestation  can  already  be  detected:
immediate exchangeability with any other different commodity existing 'along
and  outside  of  it'  is  indeed  not  something  that  naturally  belongs  to  a
commodity – at the same time, however, it cannot help but express itself as
such.
To return to Marx's analysis,  we have to take a closer look at  the further
metamorphosis  of  the  value  form.  Value  assumes  three  more  developed
forms: simple value expression (Form I) can be further evolved into the 'total
and expanded form of value' (Form II), where linen expresses itself not in the
coat  alone,  but  finds  a  variety  of  commodities  whose  material  existence
counts as the linen's value expression (be it 10 lb. tea, 40 lb. coffee, 1 quarter
of wheat, 2 ounces of gold or ½ ton of iron, etc.).61 'Every other commodity's
body now becomes a mirror of the value of linen.'62 Accordingly, the linen can
consolidate  its  value character  through its  exchangeability  with the 'whole
world of commodities'63, where it is meaningless to ask for the concrete and
61 See Marx 2008, p. 82.
62 Ibid.
63 Marx 2008, p. 77.
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specific labour that was needed to produce tea, coffee, wheat, gold or iron,
'for the labour which creates it is now explicitly represented as labour which
counts as the equal of every other sort of human labour, whatever natural
form it may possess, i.e., whether it be objectified in a coat, in wheat, in iron,
in gold.'64 Linen thus stands in relation with the whole world of commodities as
'a citizen of this world.'65 
The total  or  expanded form of  value however shows defects that  make a
further metamorphosis of the value form necessary. Not only is the relative
expression of  value incomplete,  because 'the series of  its  representations
never comes to an end'66 in the total or expanded form and could only present
itself  through  'disparate  and  unconnected  expressions  of  value'67,  but  the
heterogeneity of the disparate value expressions of the linen must assume a
homogeneous, general form which is achieved in Form III. To be sure, Marx
introduces the general form of value as an inversion of Form II by positing the
20 yards of linen as the value expression of all the other commodities (1 coat
or 10 lb. of tea or  40 lb. of coffee or 1 qtr. of wheat or 2 ounces of gold or ½
ton of iron, or x commodity A  = 20 yards of linen). This allows him to claim
that 'now the commodities express their values 1) in a single commodity, and
2) in a unified form, because each commodity expresses its value in the same
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Marx 2008, p. 78.
67 Ibid.
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commodity.'68 The  linen  now assumes  the  role  of  the  general  equivalent,
because all the other commodities measure their own value in it. 
From here, the final deduction of the money form (Form IV), money's logical
genesis, can be completed: a commodity becomes money because all other
commodities  represent  their  value  in  it  as  a  general  and  homogeneous
expression of value. The only advancement from Form III to Form IV consists
'in  that  the form of  direct  and general  exchangeability, in  other  words the
general  equivalent  form,  has  now  by  social  custom  irrevocably  become
entwined  with  the  specific  bodily  form  of  the  commodity  of  gold.'69 Gold
therefore, just like any other commodity which functions as value-body, is the
reification of human labour reduced to its abstract and general character. It is
a  purely  social  relation which only  manifests  itself  in  solid  materiality  and
therefore  gains  'phantom-like  objectivity'  as  an  abstraction from  social
relations. Money consequentially has a conspicuously paradoxical ontological
status:  it  is  society's  own  unconscious,  but  nevertheless  consciously
performed self-concealment.  
After  the  somewhat  technical,  however  necessary  reconstruction  of  the
genesis  of  money  in  value  form  analysis,  we  not  only  better  understand
exactly  why  the  emergence of  the  fetish  character  of  money, or,  for  that
matter, fetishisation in general, could take place, but also why it is not just
68 Marx 2008, p. 79.
69 Marx 2008, p. 83.
34
another  momentum among many in  the  self-sustaining  mode of  capitalist
production and reproduction that can unproblematically be neglected. It  is,
rather,  its  essential feature.  This  however  not  only  accounts  for  the  few
opening pages of Capital. In the third and last volume, close to the end of his
Critique  of  Political  Economy,  Marx  rigorously  claims  the  problem  of
reification  as  the  overall  and  basic  principle  of  the  capitalist  mode  of
production per  se:  'It  is  the  reification  [Verdinglichung]  of  the  social
determinants of production and the subjectivisation of the material basis of
production  which  characterises  the  whole  of  the  capitalist  mode  of
production.'70 Uno clearly  underestimates the  significance  of  the fetishistic
inversion  already  at  work  in  commodity  exchange,  where  the  agents  find
themselves  in  a  position  preformed  by  the  reified  structure  of  the  labour
relation. 
This  'autonomization'  of  value  and  capital  which  also  allows for  the  acts,
wants,  interests  of  individuals  themselves  to  be  fetishized  as  'free'  and
'rational', has been prominently discussed in the works of Helmut Reichelt,
among others,  who also sees the emphasis  on the acts  of  agents in  the
circulation process as an ideological symptom of bourgeois economics and
itself  as  fetishised.  Though I  would  abstain  from characterising Uno as  a
bourgeois economist, one cannot help but notice argumentative remnants of
70 Marx1964, p. 997.
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the standpoint of classical political economy in his discussion with Kuruma.
With Reichelt, I think we can see why:
To Marx,  the whole process [of  exchange] presents itself  in a form in
which  bourgeois  cognition  is  sublated  (aufgehoben)  in  the  actual
Hegelian sense: whereas the bourgeois theorists take their  theoretical
point of origin from the form of single individuals' [acts] as something that
cannot be further derived, Marx shows that this form itself is mediated,
that it itself is a result of capital.71
The corresponding  passage in  Marx  can  be  found in  the  Urtext (Original
version) of the Critique of Political Economy (1858): 
An analysis of the specific form of the division of labour, of the conditions
of production on which it rests, of the economic relations of the members
of society within which these relations are dissolved, would show that the
whole system of bourgeois production is implied, so that exchange value
can appear  as the simple point  of  departure on the surface,  and the
exchange process, as it presents itself in simple circulation, can appear
as  the  simple  social  metabolism,  which  nevertheless
71 Reichelt 2001, p. 144.
36
encompasses the whole of production as well as consumptio . It
would then result from this that  other  entangled relations of production
which more or less collide with the freedom and independence of the
individuals and the economic relations of those, are implied, so that they
can appear  as  free  private  producers  in  the  simple  relation  of
buyers and sellers within the circulation process. On the standpoint
of circulation, however, these relations are obliterated .72 
Capital  therefore  can  only  be  rightfully  assessed  as  an  objective  social
structure in which the individuals find themselves embedded in, and which
consequently dominates the rationality of their own acts. Uno's insistence on
the indispensability of the wants of the commodity owners for understanding
the value form in his discussion with Kuruma is also closely connected to his
negligence of a discussion of the labour theory of value in connection with the
genesis of money. Reichelt characterises this negligence as a symptom of a
truncated  understanding  of  value  form  and  accordingly,  a  truncated
understanding of the whole of Marx's intent:
Insofar as structural problems of bourgeois society are concerned, Marx
is not only superior to his bourgeois critics, but also to those who see
72 Marx 1974, p. 907. Emphasis added.
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themselves  as  Marxists,  but  are  not aware  of  the  connection
[Zusammenhang] between the labour theory of value and money theory
as the central problem of the first chapters of his mature work. In value
theory, Marx delivers the touchstone for deciphering the criticisms and
the  various  forms  of  reception  directed  against  him  as  inadequate,
because they rely on a standpoint which he has already overcome: that
of the bourgeois subject.73
This  is  because,  in  Reichelt's  words,  'all  bourgeois  theorists  yield  to  the
illusion  of  commodity  circulation'74 as  the  starting  point  of  the  science  of
economy, not seeing that this very relation is already inferred from the nexus
of the division of labour and value creation in production. One of the most
prominent  later  criticisms  of  the  Uno  School  and  Uno  himself  –  that  the
beginning  of  Capital with  the  labour  theory  of  value,  where  labour  is
determined as the substance of value75 and is a simple 'external' assertion
without an 'internal logical deduction', has to be dispelled and substituted for
a  value  theory  within  the  circulation  process  –  is  symptomatic  for  this
fundamental misunderstanding. Though at this point I do not intend to further
73 Reichelt 2001, p. 153.
74 Reichelt 2001, p. 143.
75 I agree with M. Heinrich who stresses that giving a 'proof' for labour as the substance of value is not at all
what Marx's analysis is about. Instead Marx is trying to reconstruct 'from this social form of the product of
labour the specific social character of labour' itself. Heinrich 1999, p. 203. To Marx, in Heinrich's view,  
the whole project of Capital consists in the critical reproduction of the particular form of labour that 
manifests itself in the value of commodities. Ibid.
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analyse the problems of this view as to how it is able to explain the production
of surplus value, and therefore capital, I want to point out the strong emphasis
Uno puts on the circulation process in his later major work Keizai Genron as
his methodical point of departure:
Capital is a special feature of commodity economy (shōhin keizai), and
as such, it has no direct relations to the production process, but emerges
from a special method of the usage of money. Merchant capital, where
capital first appears, clearly shows this. In the hands of merchants, as a
matter  of  fact,  capital  is  not  a  means of  production,  but  comes from
money and commodities. In fact, capital presupposes money, and money
can first be explained insofar as it presupposes commodities. Of course,
commodities  presuppose  products.  However,  the  relation  between
products  and  commodities  is  not  an  internal  relation  like  the  relation
between commodities and money, or commodities, money and capital,
and therefore the latter [commodities] is not necessarily developed from
the former [products].76
By  reconstructing  the  whole  original  architecture  of  Capital  through  his
criticism of the production process being the necessary point of departure for
76 Uno 1964, pp. 19-20.
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the critique of political economy – as Marx shows it to be – Uno assigns the
point of departure to the circulation process in which human subjects already
interact as free agents, regulated by the market logic of exchange, but who
are  nevertheless  able  to  confront  it  as  rational  and  independent  human
beings. In this sense, in his introduction to Keizai Genron, Uno insists that the
object (taishō)  of  political economy as a science is 'the clarification of  the
historical process as the social relations of humans acting purposefully and
consciously.'77 Not only could this understanding of human rationality under
the  conditions  of  capital  not  be  more  beside  the  point,  but  it  becomes
precarious  when,  for  the  first  time,  the  buyer  and  seller  of  labour  power
confront  each  other  on  the  free  market.78 By  doing  this,  Uno  at  least
underestimates the crucial point Marx's critique in my view is devoted to: why
in  societies  in  which  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  prevails,  the
77 Uno 1964, p. 5.
78 Gavin Walker, among others,has problematized the commodification of labour power in Uno as a vital 
problem for theorising capitalism today. He sees a paradoxical structure inherent in the commodification 
of labour power in which '[t]his paradox is expressed as the impossibility, the 'nihil of reason', or muri […] 
of capital's logic.' Walker 2012, p.16. In the figure of a torus whose inside and outside are 'coextensive' 
and reflexively supersede the logical and historical analysis of capital, he detects the structure of muri, or
the '(im)possibility' of capital's own account of the commodification of labour power and its functioning in 
general. In Walker's words, the functioning of capital can only be explained by a 'traversal' which 
'functions as a “folding”, a “pleating”, a “turning inside out”. In other words, it is not simply a “crossing 
over” or “leap”.' Instead, 'a planar surface or single topological field in extension is retroactively split into 
two, made to appear double, so that there becomes “this side” and “that side”, so that the historical 
process appears to be grounded on a set of uneven substances that pre-exist the moment when they are
revealed.' Walker 2012, p. 29. While all of this sounds veritably original and interesting, I fail to 
understand how – concretely -  the torus (or 'torsion') can provide a heuristic tool for systematically 
criticizing the 'inner' logic of Capital. As for the systematic place of the commodification of labour power 
in Uno theory, one cannot help but notice Uno's omission in embedding the commodification of labour 
power within the labour theory of value as the precondition of this type of production, the production of 
(surplus-)value for the sake of (surplus-)value. The sociation of labour as money can only take place 
when all social relations rely on wage labour. 
40
autonomisation  of  capital  emerges  as  the  dominant  form  of  sociation,
regardless of the intentions, interests, actions and wants of the people –  and
just how this autonomisation is embodied in the law of value. 
At the moment, we are still looking at a process that systematically disables
the  agents  within  the  process  to  even  be  aware  of  the  every  day
incapacitation  taking  place  matter-of-factly  in  their  homes,  at  the  working
place, in the media coverage on the European crisis. We have still not come
close to disrupt the perfect circle of capital, or to understand its workings on a
greater  social  scale.  In  this  sense,  I  am  inclined  to  maintain  that  the
reconstruction of the contradiction of value – how it could be that value exists
only in the human mind, but does not spring from it – still remains the greatest
challenge  that  the  Marxian  critique  has  posed  on  us  on  a  practical  and
theoretical level likewise.
However, the first step to disrupt the circle is to understand that the exchange
process of capital is only a derived form of capital's self-initialisation. In what
could be a direct response to Uno, Marx claims that the circulation process is
the  result of  a  fetishistic  inversion  that  takes  the  mediating  function  of
exchange to be the 'immediate being' of an economic law. This is why for him,
in an often used idiom, circulation is 'the phenomenon of a process taking
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place behind its back'79, the production process. Value as an immaterial and
objective  being  –  a  contradictio  in  adiecto  –  conceals  this  nexus,  as  the
famous theorem of the fetish character of the commodity (money) is trying to
elucidate.  Trying  to  understand  the  character  of  autonomization  should
however not lead to a 'fetishisation' of the sphere of production. As a matter of
fact,  'commodities  cannot  go  to  market  and  exchange  themselves'80,  and
without the existence of what we call 'markets', the production of value would
not make much sense. While understanding the law of motion of capital can
hardly  be  exhausted  with  understanding  the  law  of  production,  the  sole
emphasis on circulation as the beginning of  capital's  exegesis in my view
leads to the abbreviations we find in Uno. When all is said and done, it was
Marx himself who made quite clear that the conversion of money into capital
'takes place both within the sphere of circulation and also outside of it; within
the mediation of circulation, because of the purchase of labour power in the
market.  Outside  of  circulation,  because  it  only  introduces  the  process  of
valorization taking place in the sphere of production.'81 Playing off one sphere
against  the other  not  only contradicts  Marx'  programme, but  will  miss the
interlinking of production and circulation that accounts for the functioning of
capital's logic, the production of (surplus) value.
79 Marx 1974, p. 920.
80 Marx 2008, p. 99.
81 Marx 2008, p. 209.
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If  we  summarize  the  above,  we  can  say  that  in  the  capitalist  mode  of
production, commodities are produced for no other reason than to represent
value. Consequentially, value assumes the active and structuring role of the
exchange process. It is not the meaningful organization of social life meeting
the  demands  of  the  people  that  regulates  the  social  process,  but  a  law
inscribed into the rationality of exchange which, as an 'automatic subject'82,
dominates  the  social  relations  between  people.  Value  here  becomes  an
end-in-itself.  This  is  why  Marx  is  not  concerned  with  what  the  'people  in
commodity exchange think or which interests they pursue', he is concerned
with  how  'labour  is  socially  structured  so  that  the  individual  cannot  do
otherwise than exchange its commodities', as Michael Heinrich puts it.83 The
impersonal  domination  of  value  –  and  further  developed,  of  money  and
capital  –   has  created  a  seemingly  meaningful  social  coherence  before
individual  human  subjects  enter  into  the  exchange  process  as  rational
agents.84 With his interpretation, Uno remains close to the axioms of classical
political economy: it is the interests of rational agents that decide over the
exchange of commodities. Marx on the other hand took for granted that the
specific structure of the economy decides over the individual's acts. Kuruma's
82 Marx 2008, p. 169.
83 Heinrich 1999, p. 206.
84 'The creation of this coherence, though the result of the actions of individuals, is not a conscious result 
which is transparent to the individuals as such … Insofar Marx speaks of “fetishism”.' Heinrich 2009, p. 
207.
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reading, however, and in his reply to the critics of value form analysis like
Uno, in my view presents an attempt to reconstruct the form of value in a way
that allows us to grasp the whole scope of Marx's intent. I think it should be
appreciated. 
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